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I. INTRODUCTION
I’ll start with my oldest boy, John. I had a babysitter watching him and I went
to get him and they wouldn’t give him back to me. So, I went to my social
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worker and I asked him if he would come with me up there. . . . That was in
December 1970, and I asked him . . . to meet me at the store. He didn’t come.
. . . I don’t know if they had a court hearing or something. I didn’t get any
papers or nothing. . . . I didn’t know anything about it, and when I did go, they
had to appoint me a lawyer. . . . I went to see him and he didn’t try to help me
or anything. . . . He didn’t do anything because I didn’t know anything that
happened until July of 1971. . . . They had John all that time in a foster home.
. . . I didn’t know where he was. I kept asking, but they wouldn’t tell me where
he was or anything. . . . The man said that I wasn’t a very good mother and
everything, and that my children were better off being in a white home where
they were adopted out, or in this home, wherever they were. They could buy
all this stuff that I couldn’t give them, and give them all the love that I
couldn’t give them.1
The tragedy of the systematic atrocities committed against Native
Americans is a long, tragic, and bloody tale. Dating back to colonial
times, the United States has long predicated its sovereignty on the
subjugation of Native Americans.2 After the conclusion of the Indian
Wars in 1886, the pre-Columbian Indian population had been reduced
by ninety-eight percent.3 By 1887, Native lands had been reduced to
138 million acres, which were further diminished to a mere forty-eight
million acres by 1934.4 And in the 1970s, twenty-five to thirty-five
percent of Indian children were unwarrantedly removed from their
families and placed in the welfare system.5 The statement above by
Cheryl DeCoteau is only one of many similar stories told before Con-
gress when it considered the Indian-child-welfare crisis.6 Though the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA or the Act) sought to address the sys-
temic issues that created such high rates of Indian child displacement,
because of the inaction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), these
problems remain.7 Moreover, as a result of the BIA’s delayed decision
to promulgate binding regulations, its authority to do so may have
lapsed, allowing the nationwide displacement of Indian children to
continue.8
Section II.A of this Comment describes the intent and the passage
of ICWA. Section II.B explains the BIA’s decision to publish nonbind-
ing guidelines in 1979 and the effect of that decision, which resulted in
the inconsistent application of ICWA throughout the states. Section
1. Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of
the S. Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 65–66 (1974) [hereinafter
1974 ICWA Hearing] (statement of Cheryl DeCoteau).
2. See generally Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); see also William Bradford,
Beyond Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 9
(2005) (arguing that Native Americans were viewed by Western invaders as in-
herently inferior).
3. Bradford, supra note 2, at 12.
4. Id. at 24–26.
5. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978).
6. See 1974 ICWA Hearing, supra note 1.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
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II.C details the BIA’s change from its 1979 position to its decision to
issue binding regulations in June 2016. Part III of this Comment ex-
plores the challenges to the BIA’s authority to promulgate regulations.
Section III.A considers the constitutionality of the 2016 regulations
and of ICWA itself. Section III.B examines whether the BIA should be
given Chevron deference in interpreting ICWA. Section III.C illus-
trates how the Supreme Court interpretation of ICWA in Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield is supportive of BIA authority.
Section III.D outlines the considerable hurdle of the untimeliness of
the BIA’s regulations. Finally, Section III.E contemplates other conse-
quences of late action by the BIA.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Passage and Intent of the Indian Child Welfare Act
The Indian Child Welfare Act was passed by Congress in 1978 to
“protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the sta-
bility and security of Indian tribes and families.”9 The Act was passed
as a response to systemic failures that resulted in Indian children be-
ing displaced from their families and communities at “significantly
higher rates than non-Indian children.”10 As many as one-third of In-
dian children were removed from their homes and placed in the care of
non-Indians prior to ICWA’s passage.11 Finding that “[t]he Indian
child welfare crisis will continue until the standards for defining mis-
treatment are revised,”12  Congress enacted ICWA to establish “mini-
mum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive
homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.”13
The Congressional investigation lasted four years and yielded over
two thousand pages of legislative testimony at hearings before the
Senate and the House and their various committees.14 Congress con-
cluded that “the Indian child welfare crisis is of massive proportions
and that Indian families face vastly greater risks of involuntary sepa-
ration than are typical of our society as a whole.”15 Four main factors
9. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, § 3, 92 Stat. 3069, 3069
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012)).
10. Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778, 38,780 (June 14,
2016) [hereinafter ICWA Proceedings] (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23).
11. Lorie M. Graham, “The Past Never Vanishes”: A Contextual Critique of the Ex-
isting Indian Family Doctrine, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 2 (1998).
12. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 10 (1978).
13. Indian Child Welfare Act § 3.
14. ICWA Proceedings, supra note 10, at 38,780. See generally Legislative History of
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, NAT’L INDIAN L. LIBR., http://www.narf.org/
nill/documents/icwa/federal/lh.html [https://perma.unl.edu/6A5B-LRCE].
15. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9.
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contributed to such a high rate of Indian-child removal: “a lack of cul-
turally competent State child welfare standards for assessing the fit-
ness of Indian families; systematic due-process violations against both
Indian children and their parents during child-custody procedures; ec-
onomic incentives favoring removal of Indian children from their fami-
lies and communities; and social conditions in Indian country.”16
Moreover, Congress found that state actions were the cause of many of
the problems surrounding the high rate of Indian-child removal.17 It
was the “failure of State officials, agencies, and procedures to take into
account the special problems and circumstances of Indian families and
the legitimate interest of the Indian tribe in preserving and protecting
the Indian family as the wellspring of its own future” that ultimately
created the Indian-child-welfare crisis that led to ICWA.18
To address the problem, the House Report noted:
While the committee does not feel that it is necessary or desirable to oust the
States of their traditional jurisdiction over Indian children falling within their
geographic limits, it does feel the need to establish minimum Federal stan-
dards and procedural safeguards in State Indian child custody proceedings
designed to protect the rights of the child as an Indian, the Indian family and
the Indian tribe.19
The resulting legislation was an attempt to push back against the In-
dian-child-welfare crisis by placing procedural and substantive re-
quirements on state courts and parties to Indian-child-welfare cases
before the removal of an Indian child or the termination of the paren-
tal rights of an Indian child.20 Instead of continuing to rely on tradi-
tional state determinations of Indian-child-welfare cases, “ICWA
emphasizes the tribe’s competency to make adoption decisions with
respect to tribal children.”21 By placing these requirements on state
courts, Congress intended to curtail the unjust application of state au-
thority to systematically remove Indian children from their families
and communities, which had been compared to another form of geno-
16. ICWA Proceedings, supra note 10, at 38,780; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at
10–12 (explaining the failures that led to the high rate of Indian-child removal).
17. See Indian Child Welfare Act § 2(5) (“[T]he States, exercising their recognized
jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and ju-
dicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian
people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities
and families.”).
18. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 19.
19. Id.
20. B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act: In Search of a Federal Forum to Vindi-
cate the Rights of Indian Tribes and Children Against the Vagaries of State
Courts, 73 N.D. L. REV. 395, 395–96 (1997).
21. Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, One Step Forward, Two Giant Steps Back: How the
“Existing Indian Family” Exception (Re)imposes Anglo American Legal Values on
American Indian Tribes to the Detriment of Cultural Autonomy, 33 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 329, 357 (2008).
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cide committed against Native tribes.22 It was this very genocide
ICWA was designed to prevent.
B. 1979 Guidelines and Their Effects
1. The Bureau of Indian Affairs’s Position Against Binding
Regulations
As part of ICWA, Congress included a mandate to the Secretary of
the Interior (the Secretary): “Within one hundred and eighty days af-
ter the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of this Act.”23 This provision was read by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
as only granting it authority to promulgate regulations where ICWA
“expressly delegate[s] to the Secretary of the Interior responsibility for
interpreting statutory language.”24 As a result, the BIA only promul-
gated regulations in these specific areas and left other matters of stat-
utory interpretation up to the states and their courts, releasing only
nonbinding guidelines to aid in their interpretation.25
According to the BIA, Congress had not intended the grant of
rulemaking authority to allow the BIA to promulgate regulations
where the Secretary was not clearly implicated.26 Instead, it took the
position that state and tribal courts were “fully capable of carrying out
the responsibilities imposed on them by Congress without being under
the direct supervision of this Department.”27 Moreover, the BIA be-
lieved that exerting any more regulatory authority with respect to
ICWA than it had would be a violation of principles of federalism and
contrary to Congressional intent.28 The BIA instead followed the
22. Id. at 360; see Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Indian Affairs of the S. Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 2 (1974)
(statement of Sen. James Abourezk); id. at 145–48 (statement of Leon F. Cook,
Department of Indian Work, Minneapolis, Minnesota); id. at 171 (statement of
Michael Chosa, Administrative Assistant to the American Indian Child Place-
ment and Development Program, Inc.); id. at 377 (statement of Ed Howes, Du-
luth Youth Worker).
23. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, § 302, 92 Stat. 3069, 3077
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012)).
24. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg.
67,584, 67,584 (Nov. 26, 1979) [hereinafter 1979 Guidelines].
25. See generally id. at 67,584 (“Primary responsibility for interpreting other lan-
guage used in the Act, however, rests with the courts that decide Indian child
custody cases.”); Tribal Reassumption of Jurisdiction Over Child Custody Pro-
ceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 45,095 (July 31, 1979).
26. 1979 Guidelines, supra note 24, at 67,584.
27. Id.
28. Id. (“Nothing in the language or legislative history of 25 U.S.C. 1952 compels the
conclusion that Congress intended to vest this Department with such extraordi-
nary power. . . . Assignment of supervisory authority over the courts to an admin-
istrative agency is a measure so at odds with concepts of both federalism and
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rulemaking process required by the Administrative Procedures Act to
publish the resulting guidelines without legislative effect and to pro-
vide states with its interpretation of the Act.29
2. The Indian Child Welfare Act’s Inconsistent Application
Throughout the States
As a result of the nonbinding effect of the BIA’s 1979 Guidelines,
state courts were left to interpret ICWA on their own.30 This created
inconsistent law throughout the states, with the outcome of an ICWA
case often turning on where the parties were located.31 The unfortu-
nate effect of this inconsistency is that many of the problems that
plagued Indian-child-welfare proceedings prior to the enactment of
ICWA persist.32 As of 2015, Indian children were still found in child-
welfare proceedings at twice the rate of the general population.33
One result of varying state-court interpretations is the “existing
Indian family” exception.34 This exception looks to the “Indian-ness”
of the child and the child’s parents and “precludes application of the
ICWA when neither the child nor the child’s parents have maintained
a significant social, cultural, or political relationship with his or her
tribe.”35 Though the majority of states have refused to adopt the ex-
separation of powers that it should not be imputed to Congress in the absence of
an express declaration of Congressional intent to that effect.”). The BIA also re-
buked commenters who asserted that the guidelines should be published as bind-
ing regulations and left to be challenged if it is believed that the BIA does not
have the authority because “the Department has an obligation not to assert au-
thority that it concludes it does not have.” Id.
29. See id. (“Although the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedures
Act have been followed in developing these guidelines, they are not published as
regulations because they are not intended to have binding legislative effect.”).
30. See Cheyan˜na L. Jaffke, Judicial Indifference: Why Does the “Existing Indian
Family” Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act Continue to Endure?, 38 W. ST.
U. L. REV. 127, 128 (2011) (“Courts created and used the ‘existing Indian family’
exception to avoid applying the ICWA to children or parents the courts did not
consider Indian enough.”); see also Jones, supra note 20, at 396 (“Many state
courts have created exceptions to the application of ICWA and have interpreted
the statute in such a manner as to render many of its provisions superfluous.”).
31. See Jaffke, supra note 30, at 128–29 (discussing the adoption of the “existing In-
dian family” exception by the Nevada Supreme Court and the abrogation of the
exception by the Kansas Supreme Court); see also Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians
v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 46 (1989) (“[A] statute under which different rules apply
from time to time to the same child, simply as a result of his or her transport from
one State to another, cannot be what Congress had in mind.”).
32. See generally JASON R. WILLIAMS ET AL., CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, INDIAN CHILD
WELFARE ACT: MEASURING COMPLIANCE (2015), http://www.casey.org/media/mea-
suring-compliance-icwa.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/RU7P-PJF3].
33. Id. at 6.
34. ICWA Proceedings, supra note 10, at 38,782.
35. Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a
New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 625 (2002); see
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isting Indian family exception, those that have reason that the pur-
pose of ICWA is to keep Indian families together but reject any tribal
interest in preventing the removal of an Indian child from the tribal
community.36 The effect of this exception is that “if you take away a
child early enough from their tribe, they cannot develop ties to the
tribe and are therefore not part of an ‘Indian family.’”37
The existing Indian family exception is not an isolated example,
and state courts have produced other disparate interpretations of
ICWA. For example, states disagree on which standard to apply when
determining whether “active efforts” have been made to avoid separat-
ing an Indian child from his or her family.38 Additionally, states vary
on the factors to be weighed in consideration of whether there was
“good cause” for deviating from ICWA’s child-placement preferences.39
These inconsistent rulings across states have continued as a result of
the BIA’s nonbinding guidelines but may now be stopped by the BIA’s
new binding regulations, which went into effect in mid-December
2016.40
C. The Bureau of Indian Affairs’s Change in Position and
2016 Promulgated Regulations
In 2014, the BIA began to revisit its hands-off approach to imple-
menting ICWA.41 Opening up to public comment, the BIA first consid-
ered whether an update to its 1979 Guidelines was necessary.42 At the
end of its consideration, the BIA released new guidelines in early
2015.43 Despite support from several commenters, however, the 2015
Guidelines were not accepted warmly by all.44 Following the adoption
of the 2015 Guidelines, the National Council for Adoption sued the
Secretary of the Interior for violating the Administrative Procedures
Act.45 This claim was ultimately dismissed for lack of standing and
because the 2015 Guidelines, as nonbinding on state courts, are not
subject to the rulemaking process of the Administrative Procedures
also ICWA Proceedings, supra note 10, at 38,782 (explaining that state courts
look to a child and family’s “Indian-ness” before determining if ICWA applies).
36. Painter-Thorne, supra note 21, at 368, 371.
37. Jennifer Nutt Carleton, The Indian Child Welfare Act: A Study in the Codifica-
tion of the Ethnic Best Interests of the Child, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 21, 36 (1997).
38. See State ex rel. C.D. v. State, 200 P.3d 194, 205–06 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (detail-
ing differing standards among states for proving “active efforts”).
39. Compare In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1363–64 (Alaska 1993), with In re
A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543, 551 (Kan. 2009).
40. See ICWA Proceedings, supra note 10, at 38,782.
41. Id. at 38,784.
42. Id.
43. See Guidelines for State Courts and Agencies in Indian Child Custody Proceed-
ings, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,146 (Feb. 25, 2015).
44. Id. at 10,147.
45. See Nat’l Council for Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727 (E.D. Va. 2015).
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Act.46 Another case, a class action lawsuit against the BIA and the
Secretary of the Interior in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona, claimed that the 2015 Guidelines violate Equal Protection
and Due Process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, that ICWA exceeds the federal government’s power under the
Indian Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment (issues discussed
in further detail below), that ICWA violates the associational freedoms
under the First Amendment, and that the BIA acted unlawfully by
releasing its 2015 Guidelines.47 All claims in this case were also dis-
missed for lack of standing, but as of the time of this writing, an ap-
peal is pending before the Ninth Circuit.48
Despite these claims, the BIA was motivated by the fact that many
commenters to the 2015 Guidelines not only supported guideline up-
dates but also supported that the Department “issue binding regula-
tions addressing the requirements and standards that ICWA provides
for State-court child-custody proceedings.”49 Consequently, the BIA
reversed its 1979 position.50 Firmly basing itself in the Supreme
Court’s Holyfield reasoning, discussed in further detail below, the BIA
promulgated final regulations on June 14, 2016—thirty-eight years af-
ter the enactment of ICWA.51 Shortly after the final rule went into
effect, the BIA again issued updated Guidelines on December 16,
2016.52 These updated 2016 Guidelines are designed to “explain the
statute and regulations and also provide examples of best practices for
the implementation of the statute.”53
Following the implementation of the final rule, on October 25,
2017, the State of Texas and two individuals fostering an Indian child,
but unable to adopt, sued the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI)
and the BIA, as well as the Secretary of the Interior, the Director of
the BIA, and the Acting Assistant Secretary for the DOI.54 The plain-
46. Id. at 738.
47. See Carter v. Washburn, No. CV-15-01259-PHX-NVW, 2017 WL 1019685, at *3
(D. Ariz. Mar. 16, 2017).
48. Id., appeal docketed, No. 17-15839 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2017).
49. ICWA Proceedings, supra note 10, at 38,784.
50. See id. at 38,782 (“The Department’s current nonbinding guidelines are insuffi-
cient to fully implement Congress’s goal of nationwide protections for Indian chil-
dren, parents, and Tribes.”).
51. See generally id.
52. Guidelines for Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 96,476
(Dec. 30, 2016); see BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT (2016), https://
www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/bia/ois/pdf/idc2-056831.pdf [https://perma
.unl.edu/SK3T-AZNV].
53. 81 Fed. Reg. at 96,477.
54. Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Brackeen v. Zinke,
No. 4:17-cv-00868 (N.D. Tex. filed Oct. 25, 2017), https://turtletalk.files.word
press.com/2017/10/show_multidocs.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/C3PU-ZJY5].
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tiffs claim that the 2016 Regulations violate the Administrative Proce-
dure Act by violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, and Article I of the Constitu-
tion.55 The individuals seeking to adopt the Indian child separately
allege that ICWA violates both their substantive and procedural due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment, while the State of Texas
separately alleges that ICWA violates separation-of-powers norms and
exceeds Congress’s Spending Clause power.56 While this Comment
only explores some of these arguments, it seeks to answer whether the
BIA had the authority to promulgate the 2016 Regulations.
III. ANALYSIS
As discussed below, many challenges to the BIA’s rulemaking au-
thority exist. In order for the BIA to continue to have the authority to
promulgate binding regulations, the BIA must satisfy three require-
ments. First, the BIA’s regulations must not violate the Tenth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution. Second, the regulations must be given
proper Chevron deference in state courts, and the BIA must be found
to be the primary source of interpretation for ICWA. Third, and most
difficult, the BIA must overcome the issue of untimeliness. Yet even if
the BIA is able to clear all three of these hurdles, other consequences
may exist for delaying rule promulgation.
A. Tenth Amendment and Federalism Concerns
Whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs has the authority to promul-
gate binding regulations under ICWA depends in part on whether the
regulations violate the Tenth Amendment. Under the Tenth Amend-
ment, any “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”57 Due to the BIA’s position in its 1979
Guidelines, there remains a question about the constitutionality of the
BIA’s new binding regulations.58
When publishing its 1979 Guidelines, the BIA stated that
“[p]romulgation of regulations with legislative effect with respect to
most of the responsibilities of state or tribal courts under the Act . . . is
not necessary to carry out the Act.”59 According to the BIA’s previous
55. Id. at 38–50.
56. Id. at 52–58.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
58. 1979 Guidelines, supra note 24, at 67,584. When releasing these guidelines, the
BIA accepted rulemaking authority for specific provisions of ICWA in which the
Secretary of the Interior was specifically mentioned. Otherwise, the BIA rea-
soned that “[p]rimary responsibility for interpreting other language used in the
Act, however, rests with the courts that decide Indian child custody cases.” Id.
59. Id.
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position, to promulgate binding regulations would be akin to comman-
deering state courts and exercising “supervisory control” over state
matters.60 That is, the child-welfare concerns raised by ICWA were
originally purported to be matters of state concern that should be left
to the interpretation of state courts with guidance of ICWA in cases
involving Indian children.61 Therefore, the BIA took the position that
it did not have the authority to interfere with that interpretive pro-
cess. To help state courts with the interpretation of ICWA, however,
the BIA went through the rule-promulgation process and released
nonbinding guidelines meant to aid state courts rather than constrict
them.62
Since the passage of the 1979 Guidelines, the BIA has reversed its
position on this point.63 Rather than continuing to agree that the in-
terpretation of ICWA as it applies to state courts is a matter for state
courts to decide, the BIA took a new position in 2016 that the BIA
itself has the authority to pass binding regulations meant to constrain
the actions of state courts.64 Reasoning that “a lack of uniformity in
the interpretation of ICWA by State courts could undermine the stat-
ute’s underlying purposes,” the BIA changed its position and promul-
gated binding regulations.65
Specifically, the BIA argued in the memorandum preceding the fi-
nal rule published in 2016 that by “clarifying ICWA’s requirements,
the Department is exercising the authority that Congress delegated to
it.”66 Originally, the BIA was granted the authority to promulgate reg-
ulations necessary to ICWA’s implementation within 180 days of its
enactment.67 The BIA’s position is founded, then, on the constitution-
ality of ICWA itself.68 If Congress has the authority to enact ICWA,
then Congress may also delegate rulemaking authority to the BIA.69
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (“Although the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act
have been followed in developing these guidelines, they are not published as reg-
ulations because they are not intended to have binding legislative effect.”).
63. See ICWA Proceedings, supra note 10, at 37,782 (“Although the Department ini-
tially hoped that binding regulations would not be ‘necessary to carry out the
Act,’ a third of a century of experience has confirmed the need for more uniform-
ity in the interpretation and application of this important Federal law.” (citations
omitted)).
64. Id. at 38,785.
65. Id. at 38,787; see, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 23.120 (2016) (finding that unsuccessful active
efforts to prevent the breakup of Indian families must be documented in the
record).
66. ICWA Proceedings, supra note 10, at 38,789.
67. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, § 302, 92 Stat. 3069, 3077
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012)).
68. ICWA Proceedings, supra note 10, at 38,789.
69. Id.
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The constitutionality of ICWA ultimately rests on the Indian Com-
merce Clause.70 The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Indian
Commerce Clause to grant Congress plenary power over Indian af-
fairs.71 Because child-welfare proceedings involving Indians necessa-
rily are a matter of Indian affairs, Congress arguably has the
constitutional authority to pass those provisions interfering with state
court proceedings. Likewise, if Congress has the authority to imple-
ment laws interfering with state-court child-welfare proceedings in-
volving Indians, it also has the authority to allow the BIA to
promulgate regulations in line with ICWA.
However, there remains some controversy as to the absolute ple-
nary nature of Congress’s power over Indian affairs. In both United
States v. Lara and Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, Justice Thomas, in
concurring opinions, has questioned the Court’s interpretation of the
Indian Commerce Clause as granting Congress plenary power over In-
dian affairs.72 Moreover, Professor Ablavsky considered Thomas’s po-
sition in an article for the Yale Law Journal and concluded that
“[b]oth the exclusive and plenary power doctrines rest on unstable
foundations.”73 Exploring the drafting of the Indian Commerce Clause
and early arguments for Congressional plenary power over Indian af-
fairs, Ablavsky contends that Congress has not been granted plenary
power over Indian affairs under the Constitution.74
If these positions are to be believed and Congress does not have
plenary power over Indian affairs, its authority to enact ICWA would
be doubtful. Nevertheless, Congress’s absolute authority over Indian
matters is a long-standing legal precedent.75 Furthermore, the posi-
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
71. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439
U.S. 463, 501 (1979) (“Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power over Indian
affairs, may restrict the retained sovereign powers of the Indian tribes.”); United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331 (1978) (remarking that the potential prob-
lem of double jeopardy when an Indian is tried by both tribal and federal prosecu-
tions would “be solved if Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power over the
tribes, chose to deprive [Indian tribes] of criminal jurisdiction altogether”).
72. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2566–67 (2013) (Thomas, J., con-
curring) (“Although this Court has said that the ‘central function of the Indian
Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the
field of Indian affairs,’ neither the text nor the original understanding of the
Clause supports Congress’ claim to such ‘plenary’ power.” (citations omitted));
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I can-
not agree with the Court, for instance, that the Constitution grants to Congress
plenary power to calibrate the metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty.” (quota-
tions omitted)).
73. Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 Yale L.J. 1012, 1015
(2015).
74. Id. at 1021.
75. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886) (“From [Indian tribes’]
very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the
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tion that Congress lacks plenary power over Indian affairs has solely
been adopted by Justice Thomas.76 Each time Thomas has questioned
Congress’s plenary power, he has stood alone in his concurring opin-
ions—even the dissents have taken the time to rebuke Thomas’s no-
tion that Congress lacks plenary power over Indian affairs.77 Thus,
while some debate remains about the constitutionality of ICWA, the
debate is practically inconsequential. Through Congress’s plenary
powers over Indian affairs, the BIA has been granted the authority to
promulgate rules necessary to implement ICWA.
B. Applicability of Chevron Deference
Whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs has the authority to promul-
gate binding regulations under the Indian Child Welfare Act also de-
pends in part on whether the regulations should be granted deference
by state courts under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.78 If Chevron
deference were to be granted to the BIA’s ICWA regulations, previous
interpretations of ICWA by state courts would no longer be applicable
in their proceedings. Rather, the regulations would dominate ICWA
proceedings, in effect undoing thirty-eight years of state-court deci-
sions. However, because the BIA took the position that these regula-
tions are outside of the scope of its rulemaking authority, a question
remains as to whether these regulations should be granted Chevron
deference.79
Chevron deference generally applies to all reasonable administra-
tive interpretations of a Congressional grant of rulemaking author-
ity.80 That is, unless regulations promulgated by executive agencies
are “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute,” they
are given “controlling weight.”81 The rule of deference to administra-
tive agencies by state courts is compelled in Chevron, which holds
that:
Federal Government with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised,
there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.”); see also Lara, 541
U.S. at 200 (“[T]he Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to legis-
late in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have consistently described as
plenary and exclusive.” (quotations omitted)).
76. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2566–67; Lara, 541 U.S. at 215.
77. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2584 n.16 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Lara,
541 U.S. at 230 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
78. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
79. 1979 Guidelines, supra note 24, at 67,584 (“Promulgation of regulations with leg-
islative effect with respect to most of the responsibilities of state or tribal courts
under the Act, however, is not necessary to carry out the Act. . . . For Congress to
assign to an administrative agency such supervisory control over courts would be
an extraordinary step.”).
80. See 467 U.S. at 843–44.
81. See id. at 844.
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When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather
than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the
challenge must fail.  In such a case, federal judges—who have no constitu-
ency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who
do.82
Applied to the BIA’s ICWA guidelines, Chevron deference must be
granted if Congress has specifically left gaps within ICWA for the BIA
to fill.83
These gaps are quite easy to find. For instance, section 108(b)(1)
allows the Secretary of the Interior to consider more criteria than
those listed by the Act when determining whether an Indian tribe may
reassume jurisdiction over Indian-child-custody proceedings.84 By al-
lowing other criteria to be considered, Congress left open a gap for
administrative interpretation and expertise. Another instance of leav-
ing room for agency interpretation can be found in section 202.85
Again, the Secretary of the Interior is given the authority to establish
off-reservation Indian-child and -family-service programs, a number
of which are enumerated by the Act.86 However, authority is also
granted to the Secretary to establish programs which do not meet the
descriptions of the enumerated list.87 Once more, this is a clear grant
of authority to the Secretary to use his or her administrative exper-
tise. Lastly, ICWA also explicitly grants the Secretary full rulemaking
authority as is necessary to implement the Act.88 This provision alone
is enough to entitle the BIA to Chevron deference.
Nevertheless, this was not the position taken by the BIA in 1979
when it first passed its nonbinding guidelines.89 Instead, the BIA rea-
soned that “[f]or Congress to assign to an administrative agency such
supervisory control over courts would be an extraordinary step.”90
Whether the BIA can dismiss its rulemaking authority granted under
ICWA seems to be an easily resolved issue. It is the intent of Congress,
not the belief of the BIA, on which the Secretary of the Interior’s
rulemaking authority lies. The question remains, however, whether
the BIA can switch its position without affecting whether it is entitled
to Chevron deference.
82. Id. at 866.
83. Id. at 843–44.
84. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, § 108(b)(1), 92 Stat. 3069,
3074 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012)).
85. Id. at § 202.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at § 302.
89. 1979 Guidelines, supra note 24.
90. Id. at 67,584.
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Chevron did not address the issue of an agency changing its posi-
tion on its own authority to promulgate regulations.91 Yet, the Court
does address the analysis by which courts determine whether a regu-
lation is within an agency’s grant of authority.92 The first question a
court must determine is whether the statute or act of Congress speaks
directly on the issue purported to be resolved by the agency’s regula-
tion.93 If the court finds that Congress has directly addressed the is-
sue at hand, the agency has overstepped its authority.94 If the court
finds that Congress has not directly addressed the issue at hand, the
agency’s interpretation is given the highest priority.95 Under these
circumstances, only if the agency’s interpretation is completely un-
founded can it be ignored.96
The BIA was specifically granted rulemaking authority by Con-
gress to implement ICWA. While it is possible that certain provisions
of the regulations may speak directly, specifically, and unambiguously
to issues already addressed by ICWA, in the absence of such a finding,
the BIA’s regulations are to be given “controlling weight.”97 Under
these circumstances, the BIA’s regulations can only fail if they are
found to be “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the stat-
ute.”98 Thus, the BIA’s authority to pass new binding regulations does
not fail on the applicability of Chevron deference.
C. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield
While BIA authority to promulgate binding regulations is sup-
ported by both the constitutionality of ICWA and the applicability of
Chevron deference, the BIA’s 2016 regulations are further supported
by the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Mississippi Band of Choc-
taw Indians v. Holyfield.99 The Court’s analysis illustrates that Con-
gress intended the federal government, and not state courts, to create
the rules by which Indian-child-welfare matters are to proceed.
91. See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding
that where an agency’s interpretation of a statute is a permissible construction of
a statute that is silent on a direct issue, the agency’s interpretation is entitled to
deference).
92. Id. at 842 (“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions.”).
93. Id.
94. See id. at 842–43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress.”).
95. Id. at 843–44.
96. Id. at 844 (“Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
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The matter at issue in Holyfield was the inconsistent state inter-
pretations of the word “domicile” as it appeared in ICWA.100 The
Court began its analysis by considering whether Congress intended
the meaning of the word domicile to be subject to state court interpre-
tation.101 While admitting that “Congress sometimes intends that a
statutory term be given content by the application of state law,” the
Court observed that the default assumption of an Act of Congress is
that, unless there is strong evidence to the contrary, statutory terms
are not meant to be subject to State court interpretation.102
In order to determine whether Congress intended the meaning of
domicile to be subject to state law, the Court looked to the purpose of
ICWA and to its legislative history. In doing so, the Court found that:
Congress was concerned with the rights of Indian families and Indian commu-
nities vis-a`-vis state authorities. More specifically, its purpose was, in part, to
make clear that in certain situations the state courts did not have jurisdiction
over child custody proceedings. Indeed, the congressional findings that are
part of the statute demonstrate that Congress perceived the States and their
courts as partly responsible for the problem it intended to correct.103
Moreover, the Court reasoned that Congress could not have intended
the inconsistent outcomes that inevitably result from differing state
court interpretations of ICWA’s meaning of domicile.104
This decision was instrumental in helping the BIA realize that its
previous position on its inability to pass binding regulations was in-
correct.105 Reading Holyfield more broadly, the BIA argued that, in
order to carry out the purpose of ICWA, new binding regulations are
not only authorized, but they are necessary.106 Using Holyfield as a
catalyst, the BIA concluded that “it is improbable that Congress in-
tended the broad grant of rulemaking authority . . . to issue binding
100. Id. at 39–40.
101. Id. at 43 (“The initial question we must confront is whether there is any reason to
believe that Congress intended the ICWA definition of ‘domicile’ to be a matter of
state law.”).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 45.
104. Id. at 46 (“Even if we could conceive of a federal statute under which the rules of
domicile (and thus of jurisdiction) applied differently to different Indian children,
a statute under which different rules apply from time to time to the same child,
simply as a result of his or her transport from one State to another, cannot be
what Congress had in mind.”).
105. See ICWA Proceedings, supra note 10.
106. See id. at 38,788 (“[T]he Department’s conclusion is in accord with ICWA’s legis-
lative history and the carefully reasoned decision in Holyfield, where the Su-
preme Court noted that the meaning of key ICWA terms and requirements
necessarily raises Federal questions and that conflicting interpretations of the
statute can lead to arbitrary outcomes that threaten the rights that ICWA was
intended to protect.”).
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rules that interpret only those portions of ICWA that expressly dele-
gate responsibility to the Department.”107
Nevertheless, commenters to the BIA’s newly promulgated regula-
tions pointed again to the BIA’s own position in 1979.108 While the
BIA did take note of a portion of ICWA’s legislative history that
showed that state courts were to be given flexibility to interpret the
meaning of the term “good cause,”109 according to the Supreme
Court’s reading of ICWA’s legislative history, the Act was not intended
to be reliant on state-court interpretations.110 Additionally, the BIA
explained its previous position by saying that it gave “excessive
weight” to the portion of the legislative history which showed that
good cause was to have some flexibility within State courts.111
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Holyfield, the BIA adopted
the Court’s conclusion that it has the authority to promulgate binding
regulations. Despite the fact that ICWA proceedings necessarily inter-
fere with the exercise of state authority over child-welfare proceed-
ings, binding regulations are not only authorized but also imperative
to the purpose of ICWA.
D. Timeliness
The biggest hurdle the BIA must overcome in order to assert au-
thority to promulgate binding regulations is to prove that the regula-
tions are not barred by their untimeliness. The Secretary of the
Interior was granted the authority to promulgate any regulations nec-
essary for the enforcement of ICWA by section 302 of the Act.112 How-
ever, this grant of rulemaking authority provided that the Secretary
should exercise its rulemaking authority within 180 days of the enact-
ment of ICWA.113 In general, regulations may be promulgated outside
of the statutory deadline if there is no penalty spelled out in the stat-
107. Id.
108. Id. Using the BIA’s 1979 position against it, commenters pointed out that pri-
mary responsibility for interpreting ICWA lies with “the courts that decide Indian
child custody cases.” Id.
109. S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 17 (1977) (“The ‘significant contact’ test coupled with the
‘good cause for refusal’ provisions of subsection (c) are designed to provide State
courts with a degree of flexibility in determining the disposition of a placement
proceeding involving an Indian child.”).
110. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 45 (1989) (“[I]t is
most improbable that Congress would have intended to leave the scope of the
statute’s key jurisdictional provision subject to definition by state courts as a
matter of state law.”); S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 17.
111. ICWA Proceedings, supra note 10, at 38,788.
112. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, § 302, 92 Stat. 3069, 3077
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012)).
113. See id. (“Within one hundred and eighty days after the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this Act.”).
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ute for failing to act within the specified time frame.114 However, logic
and policy may restrict the BIA from acting so long after the initial
grant of rulemaking authority.
1. Brock and Barnhart
As mentioned above, if no consequences are spelled out within a
statute for an agency’s failure to act within a specified time frame,
then that agency does not lose its authority.115 The Supreme Court
first adopted this position in Brock v. Pierce County, where it consid-
ered whether the Secretary of Labor lost jurisdiction over audits con-
ducted to resolve whether a misuse of Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act (CETA) funds had occurred when the Secretary’s fi-
nal determination was issued outside of the statutorily provided pe-
riod of 120 days.116
In order to make this determination, the Court looked to both the
statutory language and the legislative history of CETA.117 Looking
first to the statutory language, the Court noted that the use of the
word “shall” normally implies compulsory action.118 However, review-
ing its precedent, the Court found that it had “frequently articulated
the great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments
alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by
the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are con-
fided.”119 Moreover, the Court noted that whether the Secretary of La-
bor is able to complete the task statutorily assigned to her is often
subject to factors beyond the Secretary’s control.120 Additionally, the
Court found it to be very persuasive that the Secretary’s inaction
would cause harm to public rights, as opposed to private rights.121 For
all of these reasons, the Court held that the use of the word shall was
not enough to remove the Secretary’s power to act.122
114. See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (2003); Brock v. Pierce Cty., 476
U.S. 253 (1986).
115. See generally Brock, 476 U.S. at 260 (“We would be most reluctant to conclude
that every failure of an agency to observe a procedural requirement voids subse-
quent agency action, especially when important public rights are at stake.  When,
as here, there are less drastic remedies available for failure to meet a statutory
deadline, courts should not assume that Congress intended the agency to lose its
power to act.”).
116. Id. at 254–55.
117. Id. at 258.
118. Id. at 258–59 (noting that “§ 106(b) speaks in mandatory language”).
119. Id. at 260 (quotations omitted).
120. Id. at 261 (“[T]he Secretary’s ability to complete [the task] within 120 days is
subject to factors beyond his control.”).
121. Id. (“In the present case, by contrast, public rights are at stake, and the Secre-
tary’s delay, under respondent’s theory, would prejudice the rights of the taxpay-
ing public.”).
122. Id. at 262.
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Looking next to CETA’s legislative history, the Court noted that it
“found nothing in the history of the 1978 amendments to CETA, which
added the 120-day deadline, to suggest that Congress intended to im-
pose a jurisdictional limitation on agency action.”123 Instead, the 120-
day deadline imposed by the statute was merely intended to provoke
the Secretary of Labor into speedy action.124 Ultimately, by looking to
the statute and the legislative history, the Court found no indication
that the 120-day time limit imposed by CETA was meant to deprive
the Secretary of Labor of her authority if she fails to act within the
specified time.125 Put more simply, if Congress intends to remove an
agency’s authorization to act after a statutorily specified time frame,
it must say so during the proposal of the statute or in the statute
itself.
This position has been supported by the Supreme Court again and
again since Brock. For example, in United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property, the Court held that “if a statute does not specify a
consequence for noncompliance with statutory timing provisions, the
federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their own coer-
cive sanction.”126 More recently, the Court examined whether the
Commissioner of Social Security could assign each coal industry re-
tiree eligible for benefits to a signatory operator where the assignment
was untimely.127 Looking again at the statute’s language and its legis-
lative history, the Court reasoned via the Brock framework that “a
statute directing official action needs more than a mandatory ‘shall’
before the grant of power can sensibly be read to expire when the job is
supposed to be done.”128 Additionally, the Court found that no legisla-
tive history supported an assertion that Congress meant the Commis-
sioner to lose his assigning authority after failing to act within the
specified time period.129 Thus, the Court has consistently held that in
the absence of Congressional intent, mere failure to act within a statu-
torily defined time limit is not enough to remove an agency’s authority
to act.
123. Id. at 262–63.
124. Id. at 265 (“The 120-day provision was clearly intended to spur the Secretary to
action, not to limit the scope of his authority.”).
125. Id. at 266 (“There is simply no indication in the statute or its legislative history
that Congress intended to remove the Secretary’s enforcement powers if he fails
to issue a final determination on a complaint or audit within 120 days.”).
126. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 63 (1993).
127. Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (2003).
128. Id. at 161.
129. Id. at 165 (“[S]uch little legislative history as there is on the point tends to show
that Congress assumed that any assignments that could be made at all (say, to
an operator still in business) would be made on time.”).
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2. Legislative History
When Brock and Barnhart are applied to ICWA, it is clear to see
that the mandatory language of section 302 is not enough to remove
the BIA’s authority to promulgate binding regulations.130 Although
section 302 states “[w]ithin one hundred and eighty days . . . the Sec-
retary shall,”131 both Brock and Barnhart illustrate that there must
be more indication from Congress that the 180-day grant of authority
was meant to be jurisdictional.132 That is, if Congress intends its
grant of authority to last only for the 180 days specified by statute,
more evidence is needed of this intent than the use of the word shall in
the statute.
Since the statutory provisions of ICWA do not remove the authority
of the BIA to promulgate regulations after the 180-day period, it be-
comes necessary to investigate the legislative history of the Act to look
for other evidence of Congress’s intent to remove the BIA’s authority
after 180 days. However, there is nothing to support the notion that
Congress intended the 180-day specification to be jurisdictional.
Rather, the legislative history seems to support the fact that Congress
intended to give the Secretary of the Interior a broad grant of
rulemaking authority.133
Specifically, original versions of ICWA included additional procedu-
ral requirements in order for the Secretary to exercise her rulemaking
authority.134 The additional procedural requirements prescribed that
the Secretary must meet with Tribes and Indian organizations within
six months to discuss rules necessary to implementing ICWA, present
proposed rules to congressional committees within seven months, pub-
lish rules for public notice and comment within eight months, and pro-
mulgate final rules within ten months.135 These procedural
requirements were removed upon an amendment introduced on the
House floor by Representative Udall that changed the bill to its cur-
rent grant of rulemaking authority.136 When introducing the amend-
ment, Udall remarked that the “amendment would simply require the
Secretary to act within 6 months of the act. However, I think it should
be clear that it is the intent of Congress that the Secretary consult
fully with Indian tribes and organizations in drafting such rules and
regulations.”137 Nevertheless, no mention was made of intending the
130. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, § 302, 92 Stat. 3069, 3077
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012)).
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. See Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 158; Brock v. Pierce Cty., 476 U.S. 253, 265 (1986).
133. See ICWA Proceedings, supra note 10, at 38,786.
134. See S. 1214, 95th Cong., § 205 (1977).
135. Id. § 205(b)(1).
136. 124 CONG. REC. H38,107 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (statement of Rep. Udall).
137. See id. (emphasis in original).
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180-day provision to impose limitations on the Secretary’s ability to
act if rules were promulgated outside of the time limit. Instead, the
amendment gave the Secretary broader rulemaking authority than
previous versions of the bill.138 Thus, since there is no legislative his-
tory to support restricting the Secretary’s rulemaking authority to the
180-day period defined by statute, Brock and Barnhart support the
BIA’s position—it continues to retain its rulemaking authority.
3. Public Policy
The BIA clearly has the authority to promulgate binding regula-
tions according to Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs, the
language of ICWA, its legislative history, and the supportive Supreme
Court case law of Chevron, Brock, and Barnhart. If ICWA’s broad
grant of rulemaking authority is to fail the BIA, it must fail, then, on
equitable grounds. Thus far, when the Supreme Court has considered
actions taken by administrative agencies that are untimely, the un-
timeliness of the actions is beyond the agency’s control.139 This is not
the case with the BIA’s 2016 Guidelines. Rather, the BIA could have,
at the earliest, exercised its rulemaking authority by November 26,
1979—383 days after it was given its authority.140 While this is
clearly still outside of the 180-day range as required by statute, the
question of whether rules promulgated on that date would be outside
of the BIA’s authority would be somewhat easily resolved, for the rea-
sons outlined above. Instead, the BIA waited nearly thirty-eight years
before promulgating regulations under ICWA.141 Because of this in-
tentional, decades-long delay, the question of whether the BIA’s
rulemaking authority remains is a novel one.
The possibility of the BIA’s lingering rulemaking authority is fur-
ther complicated by the statements of the BIA itself when it first re-
leased nonbinding guidelines in 1979.142 By first taking the position
that it did not have the authority to exercise rulemaking authority
over state courts and refusing to promulgate binding regulations, the
138. Compare S. 1214, § 205 (requiring the Secretary to meet with tribes and Congres-
sional committees and propose and promulgate regulations within specified
timeframes), with Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, § 302, 92
Stat. 3069, 3077 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012)) (requir-
ing the Secretary to promulgate regulations within 180 days).
139. See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 158 (2003); Brock v. Pierce Cty.,
476 U.S. 253, 261 (1986) (“[T]he Secretary’s ability to complete [the task] within
120 days is subject to factors beyond his control.”).
140. See 1979 Guidelines, supra note 24, at 67,584. Because the BIA was able to re-
lease its 1979 Guidelines by this time, having still followed the necessary steps
for rule promulgation under the Administrative Procedure Act, the BIA would
have been able to fulfill its rulemaking mandate under ICWA within the same
period of time. Id.
141. See ICWA Proceedings, supra note 10.
142. 1979 Guidelines, supra note 24, at 67,584.
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BIA not only allowed but effectively forced state courts into creating
decades’ worth of precedent, interpreting ICWA as it applied in each
state.143 State courts’ reliance on the BIA’s 1979 statements was not
only foreseeable, it was expected. The BIA predicted this reliance by
remarking that “[s]tate and tribal courts are fully capable of carrying
out the responsibilities imposed on them by Congress without being
under the direct supervision of this Department.”144 As a result, the
delay in BIA action and the subsequent state reliance on the BIA’s
inaction frustrate the legitimacy of the 2016 regulations.
In general, when a party is aware of her rights and fails to assert
them, causing reliance by another party for an unreasonable period of
time, the doctrine of laches can be used to estop the first party from
reasserting her lapsed rights.145 However, the questions of whether
the doctrine of laches is applicable “turns not simply upon the number
of years which have elapsed between the accruing of her rights,
whatever they were, and her assertion of them, but also upon the na-
ture and evidence of those rights, the changes in value, and other cir-
cumstances occurring during the lapse of years.”146 Thus, as an
equitable doctrine, whether a claim of laches can be successfully as-
serted against a party is a matter of weighing all of the surrounding
circumstances to determine whether it would be unjust to allow the
party to reassert her rights.
Though laches is typically only asserted against nonsovereign par-
ties, when Native Tribes have failed to assert their authority for pro-
longed periods of time, laches has been applied to curtail the extent to
which they are able to assert their sovereignty.147 Laches was first
asserted against a Native Tribe successfully in 2005 following decades
of litigation between the Oneida Indian Nation and local governments
over the proper ownership of tribal lands.148 The Court found that the
143. Id. (noting that where “primary responsibility for interpreting a statutory term
rests with the courts, administrative interpretations of statutory terms are given
important but not controlling significance”).
144. Id.
145. Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 371–72 (1892); see also Ewert v. Bluejacket,
259 U.S. 129, 138 (1922) (explaining that laches “developed and designed to pro-
tect good faith transactions against those who have slept upon their rights, with
knowledge and ample opportunity to assert them”).
146. Galliher, 145 U.S. at 371–72.
147. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 221 (2005).
148. See id. (finding that New York State’s unlawful purchase of Oneida Indian Na-
tion’s land and the State’s reliance on the tribe’s failure to assert its sovereignty
extinguished the tribe’s claim to sovereignty over the land); County of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (finding that New York State’s unlaw-
ful purchase of Oneida Indian Nation’s land made it subsequently liable to the
tribe for monetary damages); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S.
661 (1974) (finding that Oneida Indian Nation asserted proper subject matter
jurisdiction in federal court).
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Oneida Indian Nation, having failed to assert its sovereignty for
nearly two hundred years, could no longer assert its authority over
unlawfully purchased lands despite never having properly acquiesced
its power over the land.149 More recently, the Supreme Court declined
to offer an opinion on whether laches could limit a tribe’s power of
taxation despite a century-long absence.150 Thus, the fact remains
that laches may be asserted to diminish a tribe’s sovereignty where
the tribe has previously failed to exercise its right.
It is another matter altogether, however, to consider whether the
doctrine of laches could be applied to the BIA in this instance. Impor-
tantly for a laches claim, the BIA took a strong position in 1979 that
promulgating rules was not necessary to enact ICWA.151 This created
the reliance essential to a laches claim—state governments were left,
in the absence of such regulations, to create their own interpretations
of ICWA.  State courts, Indian tribes, and Indian families became well
versed in these interpretations over the course of thirty-eight years
until the BIA reasserted authority it had earlier claimed it did not
have. The only remaining question is whether the BIA’s authority
may be appropriately curtailed by the doctrine of laches.
Though a court may be willing to limit an Indian tribe’s sover-
eignty by the use of the doctrine of laches, it seems unlikely that a
court would be equally willing to limit the U.S. government’s author-
ity to act by the same doctrine in any capacity. It is important here to
recognize the distinction between the BIA’s authority to promulgate
regulations under ICWA and Congress’s authority to legislate or even
to authorize the BIA to pass such regulations. While Congress prop-
erly granted the BIA the authority to act in 1978, the BIA failed its
Congressional mandate and opted not to pass binding regulations.152
Thus, it is possible, although unlikely, that the doctrine of laches may
estop the BIA from passing the new regulations as a matter of equity.
And to be sure, if Congress were to pass an amendment re-granting
regulatory authority to the Secretary of the Interior and the BIA were
to pass regulations subsequent to that amendment, the BIA’s author-
ity would not be at issue. Rather, the untimeliness of the BIA’s actions
and state reliance on the BIA’s previous position may subject it to a
laches claim.153
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E. Other Consequences of Delayed Action
While the BIA clearly continues to have the authority to pass bind-
ing regulations implementing ICWA as a matter of law and very likely
retains its authority as a matter of equity, there may be other conse-
quences for such delayed action. That is, Native American families or
tribes may have a claim against the BIA for its failure to act. The
Tucker Act both grants the Court of Federal Claims the jurisdiction to
hear claims against the federal government founded on the Constitu-
tion, Acts of Congress, regulations, or any contract with the United
States, and simultaneously waives sovereign immunity for those
claims.154 Moreover, the Supreme Court has found that the basis of a
claim must only “be reasonably amenable to the reading that it man-
dates a right of recovery in damages. While the premise to a Tucker
Act claim will not be ‘lightly inferred,’ a fair inference will do.”155 To
determine whether such a “fair inference” exists in Indian law cases,
courts look to the extent of the duties and the fiduciary relationship
imposed on the federal government.156
Three types of trusts can exist between Native Americans and the
federal government.157 The first trust, the least burdensome on the
federal government, is one which acknowledges the special relation-
ship that has historically developed between Indian tribes and the fed-
eral government.158 While the federal government often acknowledges
this special relationship, any such “language was not intended to cre-
ate a formal trust relationship or to vest the United States with abso-
lute power, but was designed to . . . ensur[e] stable relationships with
tribes.”159 The second type of trust relationship that exists between
the federal government and Native tribes is a limited trust.160 Under
this limited-trust relationship, the applicable statute only creates a
limitations.”). But see United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 346 (1888) (“As
laches is not to be imputed to the government, the statute of limitations does not
apply to the state, unless it be clear from the act that it was intended to include
the state.”).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012); see also United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206,
212 (1983) (“[B]y giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction over specified types of
claims against the United States, the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver of sover-
eign immunity with respect to those claims.”).
155. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 473 (2003) (quoting
Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 218).
156. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.05[1][b], at 421–22 (Nell Jessup
Newton ed., 2012).
157. Id. § 5.05[1][b], at 423.
158. Id.; id. § 5.04[3][a], at 412.
159. Id. § 5.04[3][a], at 412.
160. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980) (“We conclude that the
[General Allotment Act] created only a limited trust relationship between the
United States and the allottee that does not impose any duty upon the Govern-
ment to manage timber resources.”).
1030 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:1007
right of action for any failure by the government to fulfill its duties
specified under the statute.161 The last type of trust relationship is a
full trust relationship in which the federal government undertakes
“full fiduciary responsibilities.”162 Under this kind of trust relation-
ship, “[i]n the case of a Native American claimant, where the govern-
ment has assumed pervasive control over Indian assets, the trust
doctrine unavoidably overlays and infuses the legal analysis.”163
To determine whether Native families have a claim against the
BIA for failure to promulgate binding regulations, the question next
turns on what kind of trust relationship was assumed by the federal
government in enacting ICWA. Because Congress enacted the Indian
Child Welfare Act specifically to “protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes,”
the Indian Child Welfare Act was clearly meant to establish more
than a minimum trust relationship between the federal government
and Native families.164 Rather, ICWA can be fairly read to have at
least intended to create a limited trust relationship between the fed-
eral government and native families.165 The scope of the limited trust
relationship would be based on the interpretation of the Act, which
would show that the federal government specifically undertook the
duties described in section 3 of the Act, which reads:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to protect the
best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal stan-
dards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement
of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique val-
ues of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the
operation of child and family service programs.166
The specific duties described in this section of the Act include estab-
lishing minimum federal standards for child-welfare proceedings in-
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volving Indian children that reflect the unique values of Indian
cultures and providing assistance to Native tribes’ child and family-
service programs.167 This language seems more likely to imply a full
undertaking by Congress of the fiduciary duties related to Indian-
child-welfare proceedings. Regardless, the Act further undertakes the
duty of rule promulgation in section 302.168 Whether ICWA implies a
limited-trust relationship requiring the establishment of minimum
federal standards for child-welfare proceedings involving Indian chil-
dren and the duty of rule promulgation to establish such standards or
it implies a complete trust relationship between the federal govern-
ment and Native families, the trust responsibilities undertaken by
Congress were breached as a result of the BIA’s intentional delay in
exercising its rulemaking authority. That is, ICWA very likely grants
a sufficient statutory basis on which Native families are able to bring
a breach-of-trust claim against the BIA.
IV. CONCLUSION
The BIA continues to have the authority to promulgate binding
regulations under ICWA despite its thirty-eight-year delay in doing so.
There remains a slight possibility that the equitable doctrine of laches
could be applied to stop the BIA from exercising this authority, but the
likelihood of succeeding on that theory is doubtful. Even if this claim
were to succeed, the consequences of such an action would be clearly
contrary to the result Congress intended. As the Court in Holyfield
mentioned, ICWA’s purpose was “to make clear that in certain situa-
tions the state courts did not have jurisdiction over child custody pro-
ceedings. Indeed, the congressional findings that are a part of the
statute demonstrate that Congress perceived the States and their
courts as partly responsible for the problem it intended to correct.”169
So while the procedure taken by the BIA to promulgate its new bind-
ing regulations was undoubtedly dubious, it results in the consistent
enforcement of ICWA throughout the states as originally envisioned
by Congress.
Nevertheless, the BIA may also be subject to other legal conse-
quences due to its inaction. Upon examination of ICWA, the BIA’s fail-
ure to promulgate binding regulations likely amounts to a breach of
trust for which Indian families can be compensated under the Tucker
Act. That is, while the BIA continues to have rulemaking authority
under ICWA, the delay in exercising that authority caused serious
harm to Indian tribes and families. Inconsistent state applications of
ICWA ultimately led to the continued widespread displacement of In-
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dian children from their families and communities.170 Because of the
BIA’s failure to follow its statutory mandate, Indian families and
tribes likely will be able to recover from this breach of trust.
Thus, while the BIA is not without fault or consequences from its
failure to exercise its rulemaking authority sooner, it continues to en-
joy the power to promulgate regulations implementing ICWA. Most
importantly, as a result of this continued authority, the consistent
protection of Indian children, families, and tribes in child-welfare
cases may finally begin. And when this is finally able to happen, sto-
ries like Cheryl DeCoteau’s memory of the removal of her son John
can at long last become a thing of the past.
170. See generally WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 32.
